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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1957 
 ___________ 
 
 JOSE LUIS VASQUEZ, 
 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A042-889-147) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2013 
 
 Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed February 4, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Jose Luis Vasquez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic who is present 
in the United States as a lawful permanent resident, seeks review of a Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) order denying relief from removal and declining to reopen 
 2 
 
the evidentiary record.  We will dismiss in part and deny in part his petition for review. 
 After pleading guilty in 2009 to one count of trafficking a Mercedes Benz with an 
altered Vehicle Identification Number (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2321, see S.D.N.Y. 
Crim. No. 1:08-cr-00988), Vasquez was placed into deportation proceedings.  One basis 
for his removal was the aforementioned conviction, which rendered him an aggravated 
felon under the Immigration and Nationality Act.  See Administrative Record (A.R.) 707 
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(R) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).  Vasquez sought withholding 
of removal relief (―withholding‖) and protection under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture (―CAT‖).  He claimed to fear retribution from the co-defendants in his 
federal case, who had close ties with the ―Trinitarios‖ gang and—based on their belief 
that he cooperated with the United States Government—threatened him with harm should 
he ever return to the Dominican Republic.
1
   
 Vasquez‘s applications for relief were unsuccessful.  While concluding that 
Vasquez and his girlfriend had testified credibly, an Immigration Judge (IJ) nevertheless 
determined that 1) the mistreatment feared by Vasquez was not on account of his 
membership in a ―social group‖ as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); and 2) while the 
Dominican government was ―rife with corruption problems . . . [the record] is wholly 
lacking . . . i[n] any corroboration that the government of the Dominican Republic is 
somehow influenced or infiltrated by the Trinitarios gang‖ and would therefore be 
―unable to unwilling to prevent‖ harm to Vasquez.  A.R. 139–42.  The IJ also found ―no 
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evidence that the government would likely torture [Vasquez] upon his return‖ to the 
country, or would otherwise acquiesce or be willfully blind to torture by others.  A.R. 
143–45.   Vasquez sought review from the BIA, and also submitted a motion to 
remand/reopen the record for ―consideration of new, previously unavailable evidence.‖  
A.R. 23.  The BIA affirmed, and declined to reopen the record because the new 
documents were ―cumulative of evidence previously submitted‖ or otherwise had ―little 
evidentiary value.‖  A.R. 8–10.  Vasquez filed a timely petition for review with this 
Court. 
 Because Vasquez was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) 
limit our review to ―constitutional claims or questions of law.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); 
Roye v. Att‘y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012).  The former must be ―colorable 
violations of the United States Constitution,‖ while the latter must present ―purely legal 
inquiries such as those involved in statutory interpretation‖; both are reviewed de novo, 
subject to applicable principles of deference.  Roye, 693 F.3d at 339 (citations, quotations 
omitted).  ―[F]actual or discretionary determinations‖ are ―outside of our scope of 
review.‖  Id.  To the extent that we do have jurisdiction, because the BIA‘s decision 
adopted and expanded upon the IJ‘s decision, we may review both.  Chen v. Ashcroft, 
376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Vasquez‘s arguments are hobbled by our circumscribed jurisdiction.  He contends 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 Because we write primarily for the parties, and due to the circumscribed nature of our 
review (see infra), we will forgo an extended summary of the facts of the case and 
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at length that the agency erred by determining that he did not belong to a cognizable 
social group: one consisting of perceived informants who have testified against the 
interests of Dominican gang members and their associates.  ―Whether a[] [petitioner‘s] 
proffered ‗particular social group‘ is cognizable . . . is a question of law,‖ and would 
ordinarily be reviewable.  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att‘y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 339 (3d Cir. 
2008).  But the agency also found 1) that the Dominican government has no interest in 
Vasquez beyond his status as a deportee, and 2) that Vasquez had not established that the 
government would be unable or unwilling to control his alleged persecutors, thus failing 
to meet the burden of proof for withholding relief.  See A.R. 3–4, 141–42.  These are 
issues of fact, not law.  See Fiadjoe v. Att‘y Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 2005); see 
also Ghebrehiwot v. Att‘y Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining 
withholding standard).  Even if the agency‘s social-group analysis were erroneous, its 
secondary, factual holding would defeat Vasquez‘s applications for relief.  Thus, while 
we can reach the legal issue, we must deny the petition as to this claim because we are 
bound by the agency‘s factual determination.  The CAT claim, which was denied by the 
agency on substantially similar grounds, suffers from the same deficiencies (e.g., the 
petitioner argues that ―the available evidence is clear that the Dominican government is 
aware of the torture occurring in the country against individuals similarly situated to 
[him]‖—a clear request to review the factual record, which we cannot do) and will also 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vasquez‘s alternative bases for relief.   
 5 
 
be denied.
2
 
 Vasquez also argues that the BIA erred in denying his motion to remand and 
reopen proceedings.  ―The BIA treats a motion to remand for the purpose of submitting 
additional evidence in the same manner as motions to reopen the record.‖  Huang v. Att‘y 
Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4); In re Coelho, 20 
I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (B.I.A. 1992)).  When, as here, the BIA declines to open on the 
grounds that the new proffer is cumulative or otherwise would not nudge the petitioner 
from failure to success, we ordinarily review for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 389–90.  
However, as was the case above, we are limited in present circumstances to questions of 
law and constitutional claims.  Cf. Hanan v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 760, 763 (8th Cir. 2008).  
―Garden-variety allegations of factual error such as those presented here‖ cannot suffice 
                                                 
2
 In his brief, Vasquez attacks the agency‘s burden-of-proof determination, suggesting 
that it erred by requiring corroboration of his credible testimony; ―[the agency] was 
required to explain why it believed that the evidence it demanded was reasonably 
available to the Petitioner to obtain,‖ but ―[n]o such assertion was made.‖  Pet‘r‘s Br. 14.  
A similar invocation was made during the administrative appeal, see A.R. 116, although 
the BIA did not address the matter in its opinion.  Vasquez‘s ―passing reference‖ to this 
question does not clarify upon what grounds he might wish to challenge the agency‘s 
decision, and whether (in turn) those grounds are rooted in fact or law—whether, for 
example, he wishes to allege that the process used in requiring collaboration was in some 
way faulty.  Hence, we deem the matter to be waived.  See Laborers‘ Int‘l Union v. 
Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) 
(―No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the 
availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier 
of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.‖); 
Sandie v. Att‘y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining the corroboration 
mechanism of the REAL ID Act, which applies to this petition). 
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to grant us jurisdiction.  Jarbough v. Att‘y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007).3 
 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review in 
part and deny it in part. 
                                                 
3
 Because we have seen this mistake in several recent cases, we wish to point out that part 
of the BIA‘s opinion was slightly in error.  The BIA held, in part, that an affidavit from 
one Sergio Mendez ―had not been authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b)‖, A.R. 
4; however, that regulation only pertains to ―official records.‖  Lin v. Att‘y Gen., 700 
F.3d 683, 686–87 (3d Cir. 2012).  As the agency articulated other reasons for rejecting or 
otherwise limiting its reliance on the affidavit, this error is harmless. 
